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SINGAPORE’S REGIONALIZATION BLUEPRINT: 
 A CASE OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, STATE ENTERPRISE NETWORK 
 AND SELECTIVE INTERVENTION  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Strategic management for economic development has been the hallmark of the Singapore `success story’.  State-led, 
market-driven intervention underscored the city-state’s development strategies. This paper revisits this development 
blueprint in the context of Singapore’s efforts at regionalization. The paper takes a closer look at Singapore’s state 
enterprise strategy, and the `portability’ of the strategy – in the framework of Regionalization 2000 – beyond the 
city-state. It concludes that the calculated, schematised efforts, though remarkable, have been overly optimistic and 
have failed to engender equally compelling results, more often than not frustrated by the intricacies of socio-political 
realities in the host economies.          
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Singapore’s leaders had candidly acknowledged the country as an artificial establishment with an objective and a 
finite life span, should development stagnate: 
   
“This is 1995. Can it [Singapore] go on for another 50 years? I’m not sure. Can it go on for 
another 20 years? Maybe. Can it go on for another 10 years? I would say most probably” 
- Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew (quoted in The Business Times, August 16, 1995) 
 
Against this prognosis, it has been an ongoing imperative for the city-state to formulate strategies to engender its 
continued growth. Often perceived as an archetypal interventionist state (Castells, 1988; Rodan, 1989; Regnier, 
1991; Ng, et al., 1992; Huff, 1995; Low, 1998; Yeung, 1998; Blomqvist, 2001), Singapore’s strategy to remain 
economically competitive in the global economy can be interpreted as the building of platforms for national growth 
though the management of strategic alliances and cooperation. In this sense, the selective investments are attempts 
to reallocate key economic resources (Schneider and Maxfield, 1997) via the ‘developmental state model’ (Evans, 
1995, Woo-Cumings, 1999) whereby economic restructuring, industrial transformation and rapid economic growth 
are achieved through ‘collaborations’ with private or semi-private enterprises on national economic projects (Evans, 
1995).  Aid and incentives include liberal financial subsidies or co-investments. State intervention is also apparent 
from the foreign direct investment (FDI) orientation of the policies, whereby factors of production are adjusted to 
enhance the country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. In short, the country has to be understood as an investor in 
business or society, or both (Pereira, 2001).   
 
In the early 1990s, the Singapore government’s broad strategic intentions were translated into concrete policies and 
programs (Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1991). Manufacturing 2000, International Business Hub 2000, 
Regionalization 2000 (R2000), Tourism 2000, IT 2000 Vision and National Information Infrastructure (NII) 
Initiatives, and Local Enterprises 2000 were all part of the blueprint to ensure Singapore’s continued relevance in 
the global marketplace, amidst the limitations of a resource-constrained domestic environment (Singapore Economic 
Development Board (SEDB), 1995a). This paper takes up the deliberations on Regionalization 2000 (R2000), a 
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strategic initiative to create an external economy, by participating in the dynamic growth opportunities of Asia-
Pacific economies (SEDB, 1993a, 1995a, 1995b). The paper’s main focus will be on case studies of Singapore’s 
largest, and most advanced industrial-township projects in Indonesia, China, Vietnam and India.   
 
Further background of the impetus behind R2000 is first presented to highlight the Singapore government’s strong 
interventionist style, extended to the regionalization policy. This is followed by an account of the origins and 
progress of the industrial-township projects in Indonesia, China, Vietnam and India. Discussion then shifts towards 
reflections on the Parks’ performance to-date, and their contributions to Singapore’s regionalization initiative. 
Finally, implications garnered from these experiences, as they relate to the government’s role in Singapore’s 
regionalization program, will be presented in the concluding section.  
 
SINGAPORE’S OUTWARD INVESTMENT FOCUS 
 
The dearth of natural resources has driven Singapore, a small city-state, to hone its ability to leverage global 
resources for economic growth. Singapore’s long-established stratagem of economic development through foreign 
direct investments (FDI) is well documented (Chia, 1986; Pang, 1987; Perry, 1995). By the early 1980s, rising 
business costs necessitated a shift from labor-intensive activities towards higher value-added ones. Building and 
strengthening the city-state’s ‘external economy’, through outward direct investments, was perceived to be an 
imperative (Aggarwal, 1985; Pang and Komaran, 1985; Lim and Teoh, 1986). Singapore’s economic planners 
sought to expand the island's investment horizons through an overseas direct investment program launched in 19881. 
This initiative sought to accelerate access to new technology2, or foreign markets, by supporting Singapore 
companies to form joint ventures with overseas companies in North America and Western Europe (Caplen and Ng, 
1990; Wong and Ng, 1991; Murray and Pereira, 1995). Most of these investments proved unsuccessful, resulting in 
enormous losses by the early 1990s (Balakrishnan, 1991; Kanai, 1993; Regnier, 1993). A new phase in the 
internationalisation strategy re-focused on expansion within Asia. The change from internationalization to 
                                                          
1 The main ideas were set out in the policy document, Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (SEDB, 1988). The 
1990 Global Strategies Conference added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB, 1990). 
 
2 For a more analytical approach, see Dunning & Narula (1996), Dunning (1997) and Dunning, van Hoesel & Narula (1998). 
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regionalization was rationalized by the liberalisation of foreign investment controls occurring, at the time, in 
countries like China, Vietnam and Indonesia, and the high growth rates these economies were achieving 
(Mahizhnan, 1994; Kwok, 1995; Pang, 1995; Okposin, 1999; Blomqvist, 2002). Outward direct investments 
expanded strongly, as Singapore-based firms, both local and foreign, increase their investments into the region, to 
take advantage of growing market opportunities in the region. Singapore’s direct investment abroad rose from S$7.5 
billion in 1990 to S$25.1 billion in 19953. In recent years, Singapore’s outward FDI is comparable to its inward FDI 
(UNCTAD, 2001). About 60 percent of the outward FDI still goes to Asia, but the relative share of ASEAN has 
declined with the increased importance of China (Kaiser, et al., 1996).  As with inward FDI, outward FDI have been 
influenced by government policy initiatives and incentives.  
 
Selective Intervention 
 
The Singapore government has a dominant role as a stakeholder, a facilitator and a partner to domestic enterprises 
seeking investments abroad (SEDB, 1993a, 1993c, 1995a, 1995b). The role as a facilitator and partner is evident 
from the creation of familiar Singapore-havens via industrial parks in neighbouring countries and the restructuring 
of taxation policies4. The state also embarks on fostering trusted regional networks5 identical to those within its 
domestic market, whereby interlocking interests, the intimate sharing of ideas and commonality of values, crystallize 
a macroscopic system of cooperative competition (Bellows, 1995; Yeung, 1998; Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998). This is 
especially relevant for Singapore, which, by reason of its small size, operates through interlocking directorships in 
government-linked companies (GLCs); this has facilitated the implementation of strategic initiatives, at a national 
level, with minimal conflict of interests.  
 
                                                          
3 Source: Singapore Department of Statistics.  
 
4 By 1993, Singapore had concluded 28 double taxation treaties to encourage companies to use Singapore as a base to enter the 
fast-growing economies of East Asia. An overview of Singapore’s initial incentive schemes to support the regionalization 
initiative is set out in Singapore Investment News, Regionalization Supplement (SEDB, 1993b). 
 
5 The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with business practice preferred by the linked communities of `overseas Chinese’ 
(Redding, 1990; Yeung, 1997, Brown, 1998; Lehman, 1998), which Singapore made use of in its industrial parks in Indonesia 
and China.  
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Implicit in the regionalisation strategy, is the Singapore government’s intention to draw on its effective state 
enterprise network6 (or, in local parlance, Singapore Inc), and extend this network to facilitate business ventures in 
the region. As well, given analogous cultures and understanding through racial networks, and relatively strong 
governmental directions, such an extra-territorial network had the potential for success. Theoretically, the `vested 
interests’ within the interlinked collaborative system serve to expedite processes, garner exclusive incentives, and 
negate inept bureaucracy. 
 
The strategy, itself, featured a genre of selective state intervention. Involvement in the township development is 
threefold: firstly, senior politicians are enlisted to negotiate the projects’ institutional framework (usually pertaining 
to exclusive investment privileges), and to secure endorsement from host-country governments, to give the projects 
political patronage and protection 7.  Secondly, ‘government-selected’ consortia, typically comprising Singapore 
government agencies and GLCs, take on the role of primary investors in infrastructure development. This is 
premised on the reluctance of private-sector firms to take on investments of such scale and long pay-back period. As 
well, the high risks involved in venturing into a relatively undeveloped and unfamiliar locale, where political, social 
and environmental conditions are suspect, compounded with uncertainty of investor interest, renders it inherently 
unattractive to private enterprises (SEDB, 1993c). Thirdly, the state actively markets and promotes the flagship 
projects to Singapore-based MNCs, on top of the internationalisation of Singapore companies. With a proven track 
record, SEDB’s presence adds significant weight, as `business architect’ and `knowledge arbitrageur’, to the 
promotional efforts. 
 
From the strong interventionist style, Singapore appears to have embraced the ‘new trade theory’ which suggests 
that incisive and well-planned government support reaps the potential benefit of enhancing the likelihood of 
domestic companies becoming first-movers in newly emerging countries, even to the extent of replacing the original 
first-movers. The establishment of Singapore’s industrial townships in the region, fashioned to create a `Singapore-
                                                          
6 The principles of government involvement are rationalized in the Report of the Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas 
(Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993).  
 
7 Mechanisms include familiarization tours, formal and informal contacts amongst government officials, the constitution of ad-
hoc problem-solving committees, and visits by ministerial delegations that emphasize the establishment of interpersonal 
relationships (Kumar and Siddique, 1994). 
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styled’ business environment in emerging economies, illustrates this. The transborder industrialization strategy 
envisioned that, what follows, would be the generation of economic space for Singapore-based companies, both 
indigenous and foreign, to redistribute resource-dependent operations to lower-cost production sites and upgrade 
their Singapore-operations to higher-end activities which require the city-state’s unique set of competencies.   
 
The following case studies of the industrial parks in Indonesia, China, Vietnam and India serve to illustrate the 
prevalence of the Singapore government’s role in developing, managing and marketing these gargantuan overseas 
investments. As well, this strategic initiative can also take on an uncharted perspective of being an end in itself, that 
of exporting Singapore’s expertise in industrial infrastructural development across the region (Tan, 1995; Perry and 
Yeoh, 2000). 
 
SINGAPORE’S OVERSEAS INDUSTRIAL PARKS 
 
The Indonesian Parks 
The first of Singapore’s overseas industrial parks, Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) and Bintan Industrial Estate 
(BIE), are located on the neighboring Riau islands of Batam and Bintan. BIP and BIE began operations in 1992 and 
1994 respectively. The projects were joint ventures between Singapore GLCs and Indonesia’s largest business 
conglomerate at that time, the Salim Group. Singapore’s main industrial infrastructure builder, Jurong Town 
Corporation, and Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (now SembCorp Industries), led the design, 
physical development and management of the estate. Salim, with its close links to senior Indonesian politicians and 
privileged access to major investment projects in the Riau islands (Perry, 1991; Yeoh et al., 1992; Hill, 1996), 
provided a guarantee of priority with respect to regulatory controls and government permissions. The division of 
responsibilities assured Singapore of priority placing on regulatory issues in the host environment, and enabled the 
strategist city-state to leverage on its reputation for transparency, reliability and efficiency, to foreign investors. 
 
The Parks’ design is broadly identical and they were envisaged to be self-sufficient, self-contained environments 
with communication and business linkages through Singapore, by-passing Indonesia’s bureaucracy. BIP’s prototype 
structure includes internally-managed power generators, water treatment plant and sewerage system, 
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telecommunications facilities, and commercial centres. BIP has its own shipping and warehouse provider, offering 
freight transportation to and from Singapore. BIE replicates BIP’s design and organisational attributes, with the 
additional feature of having its own port and direct ferry connection to Singapore. Labor is mainly recruited from 
Java and Sumatra.  
              
BIP has been successfully developed, with 82 companies employing 65,000 workers anchored in the Park. 
Investment commitment is in excess of US$1 billion, with a strong presence of Japanese firms in the Park. In 
marked contrast, BIE’s performance remains modest with only 35 tenants and 13,000 workers (against the initial 
projection of 130,000). Only 110 hectares of the 4000-hectare project has been developed, at a cost of US$113 
million. BIE’s investor profile is largely Singaporean, engaged in relatively low value-added, light industries. The 
project has since been downsized to a 500-hectare development. The Parks’ operational statistics are presented in 
Table 1. New investment commitments in BIP have, however, plummeted, and investments in BIE have trickled to a 
halt in the wake of the October 2002 Bali bomb blasts.  
 
The Chinese Parks 
The physical design of the two industrial townships in Suzhou and Wuxi is identical to the BIP-prototype. The 
strategic context, however, differed. Singapore’s primary concern with the Indonesian investments had been to 
promote the restructuring of the Singapore economy, and exploit the resource complementarities of contiguous 
economies (Liew, 1990; Perry, 1991; Parsonage, 1992; Yeoh, et al., 1992; Toh and Low, 1993; Pomfret, 1996; 
Peachey, et al., 1998). As well, the Indonesian experience was less complex to begin with; endorsements from 
senior politicians guaranteed a degree of administrative certainty, strengthened by the political patronage of the main 
commercial partner. China, in contrast, had a more complex administrative and regulatory environment, and the 
projects had to contend with multiple tiers of government administration, and the competition (or more precisely, the 
`fiscal politics’) between these tiers at a time of rapid economic and political changes (Hsing, 1998). The Suzhou-
Wuxi projects also had a distinct political agenda, viz, to showcase the Singapore development model and its 
transferability to other Asian environments.  
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China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) was Singapore's most ambitious, and controversial, overseas 
township project. The project cost was estimated at US$20 billion. The project, at 70km2, was conceived as a 
balanced community with a full range of urban facilities for its resident population of 360,000. CS-SIP was slated to 
be the new commercial centre of Suzhou and its surrounding areas. The Singapore model, as applied to CS-SIP, 
envisaged a large-scale project to facilitate institutional innovation, autonomy from aspects of local government 
control and investment in administrative practice or ‘software development’ (Cartier, 1995; Perry and Yeoh, 2000). 
This project encompassed high quality infrastructure, pollution control, ‘one-stop’ non-corrupt operating and 
decision-making processes, minimum entry or performance regulation, transparent financial charges, and the 
delivery of social and welfare services to support an efficient and co-operative workforce and a work-oriented 
community. Three landmark agreements were signed in Beijing on February 26, 1994, and CS-SIP was officially 
launched on May 12, 1994.  
 
The project was a joint venture between a consortium of Chinese and Singapore-based investors known as the 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Company (CSSD). The Suzhou Industrial Park 
Administrative Committee (SIPAC), a local authority, was formed to oversee CSSD’s work. The Chinese 
consortia’s 35 percent stake was shared amongst 12 organizations, mainly national state-owned enterprises and 
investment companies of the Suzhou city and Jiangsu province. The Singapore consortium’s 65 percent stake was 
distributed amongst 24 organizations, mainly Singapore GLCs, and the Salim Group (through a subsidiary, KMP 
China Investments). The two consortia retained separate identities and responsibilities, taking up projects according 
to their agreed roles (SIPAC, 1999).  
 
The synergy that was envisioned at the onset of the project was, however, misjudged. Singapore’s disappointment 
was indicated by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s public questioning of the commitment of the Chinese partners to 
the project8. By end-1998, there were only around 1,000 residents in the township and a total workforce of 6,000 
(SIPAC, 1998). The slow progress resulted in financial losses for the Singapore-led consortium, which funded the 
land development and infrastructure, and also for Singaporean investors involved in peripheral projects. Official 
                                                          
8 The Straits Times, December 5, 1997. Some commentators have challenged this position, suggesting that favoritism runs the 
CS-SIP way. It had political support from the Chinese President down, and had autonomy (e.g. in planning and land use) not 
available elsewhere in China.  
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estimates placed Singapore’s investment in CS-SIP at only US$147 million9. In June 1999, it was announced that 
Singapore would reduce its involvement in the project and transfer majority ownership of CSSD to the Chinese 
consortium from 200110. In January 2001, CS-SIP had attracted 133 projects, with more than 91 operational 
international firms and 14,000 employed. 
 
Interestingly, investments began to pour in thereafter, with profits expected in 2001, the first time since the Park’s 
inception. By June 2001, 193 investment projects worth over US$5.1 billion were recorded. CS-SIP’s growth 
continued into 2002, with US$15.4 billion in contractual investments signed to date. Its tenant profile included, 
significantly, a high proportion of American and European investors, with some 73 percent of the investments 
directed into electronics, information technology and other high-tech segments. The Park is now an investment hub 
for 38 Fortune 500 companies11, and is expected to clinch US$20 billion in contractual overseas investment by 
2004. CSSD plans to be listed by 2004.. According to CS-SIP officials, plans are in the pipeline for the completion 
of the second and third phase of the transportation network and other infrastructure developments at a cost of US$10 
billion12. 
 
From Suzhou … to Wuxi 
Wuxi Singapore Industrial Park (WSIP) is a smaller project than CS-SIP, and was instigated purely as a real estate 
development. WSIP is designed for wholly foreign-owned investments, and emphasizes the formulaic ‘one-stop’ 
service, and tax incentives to match those in CS-SIP. Despite proximity to Wuxi’s urban district, the Park’s design 
incorporates its own service facilities, dormitory accommodation and an executive village, and is marketed on the 
basis of its strategic location, quality management service, world-class infrastructure, and telecommunications and 
                                                          
9 The Straits Times, August 4, 1999. The political cost may well be in the suggestion that Singapore was naive in perceiving that 
it would obtain a special status in China (The Economist, January 3, 1998). 
 
10 The Straits Times, June 30, 1999. 
 
11 Financial Times, December 12, 2002. 
 
12 Oana-Xinhua News Report, December 18, 2002. 
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transportation networks. WSIP started as a 70-30 joint venture between a Singapore consortium13  and the Wuxi 
municipal authority14. However, in contrast to CS-SIP, Wuxi municipality is the sole Chinese partner involved in 
the project compared with the multiple parties involved in CS-SIP. WSIP, unlike CS-SIP, was negotiated directly 
with the Wuxi authorities15, and this direct involvement has minimized the polarization between the higher echelons 
of Chinese government and the provincial government.  
    
Singapore’s EDB played a recognised part in bringing the first tenants to WSIP, and noticeably, the Park’s anchor 
tenants are mostly multinationals with operations in Singapore. Exports from WSIP exceeded US$1 billion in 2002, 
and employment stood at 15,000. The total investment attracted has, nonetheless, been below that attracted to CS-
SIP, with a larger representation from Asian investments in comparatively lower value-added sectors. WSIP 
currently has 75 committed tenants, 60 of whom are already operational.  
 
WSIP has been developed to its second phase. The project chalked up losses of S$3.8 million and S$4.3 million in 
1998 and 1999, respectively, and managed to trim its losses to S$2.8 million in 200016. In May 2002, the Singapore-
led consortium decided to pare its stake in the loss-making WSIP. The transfer of majority ownership and 
management control would, according SCI officials, result in better “alignment of interests and improve the 
operating efficiency of the park”17. SCI has provided for an extraordinary loss of S$48.3 million for its loans to the 
Park.  The Park’s performance has reportedly turned around in 2002, and the project is expected to register a profit 
for 2003.  As at December 2003, US$258 million has been spent on the development of WSIP.  
                                                          
13 The Singapore consortium is led by SembCorp Industries (SCI), with the other principal investors being Temasek Holdings 
(the Singapore government’s main investment holding company) and the Salim/KMP Group. 
 
14 The local authority has interests in other industrial estates (e.g. One Zone-Five Parks-One College initiative (which includes 
the Wuxi Software Park, Science & Technology Industrial Park, Machinery & Electronics Industrial Park, Huayang Science & 
Technology Park, and Wuxi Information Technology College) as well as Wuxi University Science & Technology Park. 
Singapore officials we interviewed in July 2002 have highlighted that these other projects are not direct competitors, as only 
WSIP is designed exclusively for wholly foreign-owned ventures. 
 
15 A Singapore government source attributes the difficulties to the fact that CS-SIP is essentially a central government project: 
“Suhou is very much a Beijing-Singapore affair, so the co-operation between Singapore and the municipality has not been as 
smooth as in Wuxi, which is a project between Singapore Technologies and the municipality.” (Source: personal communication 
with SembParks Management  Pte Ltd., June 2002) 
 
16 SembCorp Industries, Annual Reports, various years. 
 
17 The Straits Times, May 14, 2002. 
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The Chinese partner has recently announced plans to develop the third phase of the project, which will double the 
Park’s size. Interestingly, even though WSIP had not experienced the administrative difficulties that plagued CS-
SIP, the handover to Chinese management in January 2003 mirrors the outcome of CS-SIP.  SCI has reduced its 
stake from 70 percent to 49 percent, and expressed its ultimate interest in divesting its entire interest in WSIP, which 
it considers to be its `non-core business’.  Plans to list WSIP in two to three years’ time have been announced18. 
 
Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) 
VSIP is Singapore’s flagship investment in Vietnam. The plan was first mooted in March 1994 by the then 
Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, and Singapore’s Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong. The Singapore-styled 
industrial-park environment was replicated. VSIP offers investors a ‘hassle-free’, self-contained, one-stop service 
with prepared land plots and ready-built factories, Singapore-style management expertise and infrastructure support. 
A 200,000 working population within a 15-km from VSIP provides a ready pool of low-cost, skilled labor. 
 
In VSIP, Singapore applied lessons learned from its China experience, and made deliberate efforts to foster strong 
collaboration with local authorities. A Management Board19 was set up, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Binh 
Duong Province People's Committee, which pre-empted the perception that VSIP was a partnership forced upon by 
the central government. VSIP is jointly developed by a Singapore consortium led by SembCorp Industries20 (51 
percent), and Becamex, a state-owned enterprise.  
 
SEDB’s role in promoting VSIP is evident. The difficult environment post-1997, notwithstanding, cumulative 
investment commitments in VSIP exceeded US$400 million within the first 5 years from its launch in 1995. VSIP 
had, by November 1998, attracted US$370 million in investments in a broad swathe of industries: food, electrical 
and electronics, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, specialty materials, consumer goods and light industries. The tenant 
                                                          
18  The Business Times, December 4, 2003. 
 
19 The Board, with representatives from the ministries of Trade, Finance and Interior, as well as the General Customs 
Department oversees the issue of investment licenses, import/export permits, and construction permits.  
 
20 Other members of the consortium include Temasek Holdings, JTC International, UOL Overseas Investments, Salim’s KMP 
Group, LKN Construction, and MC Development Asia. 
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mix reflects the importance of Asian MNCs, while the sector mix ranges from textiles, to electronics and 
pharmaceuticals. VSIP has a list of `priority’ industries, which adheres closely to the official list of preferred 
industries21. However, unlike the other parks, VSIP is less selective of target industries. Investment commitments in 
VSIP are currently valued at over US$600 million from 124 tenants, of which 80 are already operational. 24,000 
jobs have been created, with the number expected to rise to 40,000 when the remainder of the tenants start their 
operations. The Park posted its first profits of US$ 4 million in 2002. 
 
International Technology Park Limited (ITPL) 
ITPL, located 18 km away from Bangalore in India’s Silicon Valley22, was launched in 1994, as a forerunner for a 
new generation of Singapore-developed industrial parks in India. The idea was mooted by Singapore’s Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong and India’s Premier, P.V. Narasimha Rao, in 1992. Construction commenced in 
September 1994, and the park was officially inaugurated in 2000. The partners in the ITPL project are a Singapore 
consortium of companies23 led by Ascendas International, India’s Tata Group and the Karnataka state government 
in a 40-40-20 arrangement24.  
ITPL was marketed as an environment that “cuts through the red tape and bottlenecks that are a part of India’s 
infrastructure and operating environment”25. The Park’s development consists of 2 phases. Phase 1, which includes 
the Discoverer, Creator and Innovator blocks, with built-up office, production and retail space, adopts the 
Singapore-styled, integrated `work, live and play’ concept. ITPL’s futuristic design comes complete with numerous 
amenities, facilities and support services, and includes residential apartments and penthouses. More distinctively, 
ITPL guarantees uninterrupted power supply and telecommunication facilities, immediate-occupancy business 
                                                          
21 Details are given in Circular No. 8, List of Encouraged, Limited and Prohibited Industries in Export Processing Zones and 
High-Technology Industrial Zones, issued on July 29, 1997. 
 
22 Indian universities reportedly graduate about 20,000 to 30,000 software engineers every year, and Bangalore has been a 
`hunting ground’ for Singapore companies and Singapore-based MNCs seeking low-cost IT specialists. 
 
23 The Singapore consortium includes RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers, L&M Properties, Sembawang Industrial, 
Technology Parks (a Jurong Town Corporation subsidiary) and Parameswara Holdings (the investment arm of the Singapore 
Indian Chamber of Commerce). 
 
24 The state government has since reduced its stake to 6 percent, while the Singapore consortium and the Tata Group have 
increased their respective stakes to 47 percent each. 
25 The Straits Times, August 8, 1999. 
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incubator space, and the formulaic `one-stop’ service. Phase 2, comprising the Explorer building, an exact replica of 
the Innovator, Built-To-Suit (BTS) facilities, is due for completion in early 2004.   
ITPL’s first development phase is fully committed. The first 39 tenants, creating some 2000 jobs, started their 
operations in 1999. To-date, there are 100 confirmed tenants, of which 93 are operational with 8500 employees. 
More than half these tenants are represented by wholly foreign-owned firms, including global players like AT&T, 
IBM, Motorola, Sony, Texas Instruments and Thomas Cook, while more than 70 percent are in software 
development, integrated circuit design, research and development and precision technology. Operating profits have 
been registered, and ITPL is projected to break even within the next 2 to 3 years.       
  
SINGAPORE’S FLAGSHIP PROJECTS: SOME REFLECTIONS 
 
In Asia’s rapidly growing economies, infrastructure can be unreliable and administration subject to corruption 
(Hatch and Yamamura, 1996). Foreign investment is invariably drawn to investment enclaves that provide 
privileged access to international trade, principally export processing zones, as well as in and around centres of 
international infrastructure, or to ‘shady corners’ (Lundan, 2003) that are not fully open to competition. Singapore’s 
overseas parks are configured to exploit these emerging production networks. This context provides opportunity for 
Singapore-developed parks through the provision of superior infrastructure and the ability to negotiate investment 
concessions.  
 
The special privileges secured by Singapore’s flagship projects share a common trait: many of the privileges 
obtained were unprecedented, and unique, to the Parks. For instance, all the Parks were allowed to built and operate 
their own power and water treatment plants, and telecommunication facilities, which in Indonesia and Vietnam, was 
an exclusive concession granted to the Singapore partners. As a result, the Parks enjoy the reputation of reliable 
infrastructural facilities in areas where these facilities are an anomaly. As well, the management boards of the Parks 
typically include local government officials, an arrangement which facilitates the Parks’ privileged access to 
investment approvals, construction activities, import/ export permits and immigration matters. Together, the self-
sufficient, self-contained environment of the Parks presents investors with a formulaic one-stop service which filters 
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out administrative uncertainties associated with emerging economies. Significantly, Singapore’s positive reputation 
with multinational corporations for its stable, corrupt-free investment environment lends credibility, such that it 
seems privileged to be located in the Parks. For example, ITPL is being used by many tenants to establish their 
brand-image, as there is prestige associated with being located in the Singapore-styled Park. 
 
Influence can also be exerted through inter-governmental interaction and, where existing, through the links to 
influential ethnic business groups in the investment location who often rely on state patronage for their access to 
infrastructure development projects. The key Singapore partners involved in these projects were GLCs (notably 
SembCorp Industries, Keppel Corp and JTC’s Ascendas), and Temasek Holdings (the Singapore government’s main 
investment holding company). For the Indonesian parks, the main local partner was the Salim Group, which, albeit 
private, is nevertheless well known for its close links to senior Indonesian politicians and privileged access to major 
investment projects. For the Chinese parks, Singapore’s GLCs work in partnership with government agencies, 
national state-owned enterprises and investment companies of local/municipal authorities. Similarly, in VSIP, the 
local partner, Becamax, is a state-owned enterprise. The most recent venture, ITPL in India, also shares the 
characteristic of strong government involvement, with the Indian counterparts being the Karnataka state government 
and the Tata group, which, though private, is nonetheless well connected with local authorities. The strategic 
alliances between Singapore’s own state-owned enterprise networks, and its counterparts in the regional sites, were 
instrumental in mobilizing the financial resources to complete these multi-million projects and, in most cases, within 
18 to 24 months.  
 
Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, the strategically `engineered’, inter-government endorsement of the flagship 
projects, and the enormous resources mobilized through the strategic partnerships, have `failed’ to shield the Parks 
from a gamut of problems. Issues pertaining to the scale and character of development of BIP and BIE, viz, BIP’s 
resemblance to a Japanese investment enclave and vulnerability to a withdrawal of Japanese investments, BIE’s 
infrastructural dilemmas, as well as the limited impact of the Indonesia parks on the transfer of low value operations 
from Singapore, and the associated upgrading of linked activities in Singapore, have been discussed in Peachey, et 
al. (1998), Grundy-Warr, et al. (1999) and Perry and Yeoh (2000). Peachey, et al. (1998) have drawn attention to the 
influx of immigrants to the islands and, concomitantly, to the social problems of squatter settlements which threaten 
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to overwhelm the investment value of the Indonesian parks. There is also an extensive literature, ranging from 
journalistic pieces to scholarly works (e.g. Cartier, 1995; Yeung, 1998; Perry and Yeoh, 2000), on the Suzhou-Wuxi 
experience26.  
 
The following observations update, and offer new insights, on the industrial parks in Indonesia and China, and 
present data on recent developments in the lesser-known flagship projects in Vietnam and India.  
  
Heightened competition 
Singapore’s overseas industrial parks are increasingly facing strong mounting competition from competing parks 
within their vicinity. Competitor parks, some of which are backed by prominent Indonesian politicians, have 
mushroomed around BIP.  Panbil Industrial Park, one of the largest of these parks, is located opposite BIP and offers 
similar factories at competitive rentals. The S$360 million Latrade Industrial Park, to be developed over five years, 
cuts in at the small-and-medium enterprise segment. To the present, BIE struggles to gain investment momentum 
and has yet to prove its economic feasibility. Rising labor costs have also dented BIE’s competitiveness in attracting 
new investments27, while recent press reports cite sluggish bureaucracy, lack of legal certainty and security, and 
unclear investment policies as reasons for Riau’s investor exodus28.  
 
VSIP’s attractiveness has been similarly eroded by competition from newer, albeit smaller, industrial parks 
developed by experienced and street-savvy developers from Japan, Korea and Taiwan. These competitor parks’ 
market themselves aggressively on price, charging significantly lower rentals for “no frills” land space. For ITPL, its 
success apparently hinges on the “Singapore-styled design and management” reputation, and its capacity to provide 
stable electricity is the only differentiating factor from the other IT parks like the Software Tech Park and 
Electronics City. There is a possibility that the Park’s attractiveness may be eroded, in time, as more IT parks and 
                                                          
26 The Singapore government has commissioned a study on the problems encountered in the CS-SIP project. The confidential 
report was published in 2003. 
  
27 Indonesia’s minimum wage level works out to US$66 per month against Myanmar’s US$16 and Bangladesh’s US$18 for 
labor-intensive sectors such as textile, footwear, toys and fashion accessories. Foreign investors have also taken issue over the 
perceived reluctance of authorities to clamp down on worksite stoppages (The Straits Times, August 24, 2002). 
 
28 The Straits Times, August 30, 2003; The Straits Times, December 5, 2003. 
 
 17
companies are set up in the vicinity to capitalize on the area’s repute, while offering lower rentals with equally 
reliable energy, as the state develops. The economics of market competition have called into question the premium 
attached to the `superior infrastructure’ in Singapore’s industrial-investment enclaves. 
 
The Suzhou-Wuxi experience is somewhat different. In CS-SIP, competition was heightened by the Park being the 
second industrial zone to open for foreign investment within the Suzhou municipality. The Suzhou New District 
commenced in 1989, and it was favoured for commercial and housing development as well as by foreign investors. 
The Suzhou authorities were also reportedly exploiting Singapore’s marketing efforts and re-directing investors to 
SND29. CS-SIP’s government endorsement had, in turn, and ironically, tilted the scale against WSIP in the 
competition for foreign investments. Evidence points to companies opting for CS-SIP as WSIP ‘”as not backed as 
strongly by the two governments” (Law, 1996).  Interestingly, the marketing of these industrial parks have now 
taken on a concerted and co-ordinated approach, with the transfer of majority control to the Chinese partners. 
  
Political ‘Commitment’   
For the projects in Indonesia and China, but less obvious in Vietnam and India, the reliance on personal ties rather 
than transparent contracts has had advantages and disadvantages. In the Indonesian projects, the reliance on the 
Salim Group has been necessary in the context of the Indonesian system of ‘crony capitalism’ fostered by then 
President Soeharto. The end of the Soeharto era, and pressure from the IMF and western governments for financial 
transparency, has diminished Salim’s political and commercial influence. Ownership changes at BIP and BIE have 
brought about uncertainties30, as the Parks’ privileged access to senior politicians and policy-makers in Jakarta has 
proved more difficult. Compounding these uncertainties, inter-governmental endorsements, post-Soeharto, no longer 
suffice to secure commitments at the lower tiers of government31. Anecdotal evidence32 points to a more complex 
                                                          
29 For instance, it was reported that Suzhou’s vice-mayor, Wang Jinhua, told potential investors in Germany in 1997 that they 
should invest directly in China without Singapore’s help, and that all of Jiangsu’s resources would go to SND, not CS-SIP (The 
Straits Times, January 15, 1998).  
 
30 The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency has reportedly offered to sell the Salim Group’s stakes in all the Riau projects – 
estimated to be worth S$500 million – in a packaged deal (The Business Times, August 28, 2001). Further restructuring have 
taken place, with the three main stakeholders now being SCI, Ascendas and the Indonesian government. 
 
31 Law No. 22/199 allows provincial, district and municipal governments to write provincial laws, some of which contradict 
national laws, or test the boundaries of their power. The Megawati administration is now proposing a revision of laws on regional 
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regulatory environment for foreign companies, as they have to deal more intensively with the provincial and sub-
provincial (district) governments. The Parks’ reputation as investment enclaves has also not been left unscathed by 
political developments in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the September 11 attacks in the United States, 
and more recently, the Bali bomb blasts. In addition, negative press reports on active terrorist cells within the region 
serve little to quell the innate risk-aversion of potential investors33. The Parks could do without these added 
sentiments in its larger environment. 
 
In China, the projects were expected to benefit from the ability of Singapore’s Chinese elites to obtain a special 
status through their ethnic allegiance and dual connections to overseas Chinese and western business networks. In 
reality, the limits of relying on personal ties have been most immediately encountered in the Suzhou-Wuxi projects, 
where inter-government endorsement at the top has proved insufficient to secure similar commitment in the lower 
tiers of government. In CS-SIP, the influence of provincial and municipal administrators, and their interests in 
competing developments, has diminished the significance of inter-governmental endorsement of the project. The 
impact of investment incentives allocated to CS-SIP was also diluted as its distinctive features were sanctioned to be 
replicated in other development zones. More importantly, the Suzhou municipal government’s profit-making 
priority tended to favour projects that channel revenue to the municipality. As such, the concession granted to 
SIPAC allowing it to retain its entire development revenue for the first ten years put the CS-SIP at a disadvantage, 
even though the country’s senior government officials pledged priority commitment to the Park.  
 
In Vietnam, the ‘special’ support from the local authorities has proved to be less significant than initially thought. 
Improvements on infrastructural projects have translated into a plethora of miscellaneous fees, and added to 
operating costs34. Our on-site interviews, conducted in August 2002, point to negative undercurrents over 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
autonomy, but the direction remains unclear. For a discussion on the problems with regional autonomy and their impact on 
business, see Van Zorge, Heffernan & Associates (April 2002).  
 
32 Interviews with executives and tenants in BIP and BIE were conducted in July and September 2002, respectively, and both 
parties have alluded to this changed operating environment. 
 
33 Indonesia’s state investment agency reported a 35 percent slump in foreign investment approvals, from US$ 15.1 billion in 
2001 to just US$9.7 billion in 2002 (The Straits Times, January 9, 2003). 
34 Corruption remains endemic. Transparency International, a global counter-corruption watchdog, ranks Vietnam as the second 
most corrupt country in South-East Asia (after Indonesia). The Vietnamese government itself recently estimated that light-
fingered bureaucrats creamed off at least 20% of the infrastructure spending (The Economist, September 14, 2002).  
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Singapore’s control and management of VSIP. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, while there is an interest in 
learning from Singapore, tensions have arisen over Singapore-styled management practices, and these have 
translated into perception differences, protracted conflicts and project delays. Local sentiments towards the 
Singapore partners were not unlike those expressed in the Suzhou-Wuxi experience in China, albeit to a lesser 
degree. It is not inconceivable that the ownership-management structure of VSIP may, in time, be restructured to 
reflect a “better alignment of interests”. Significantly, the Singapore partners have announced plans to partially 
divest their stake in VSIP, even as the project is finally registering positive returns35. 
 
In India, varying degrees of commitment and support by different state governments towards the country’s 
development can affect ITPL’s competitive advantage. The lack of good supporting infrastructure in the surrounding 
environment, and the disparity in local state-government supporting different cities, serve as a deterrent to investors, 
even as cities like Hyderabad, Mumbai and Chennai continue to advance technologically.  On a broader front, 
corruption remains endemic, and bureaucratic red-tape is difficult to circumvent. These considerations are, by 
themselves, deterrence to potential investors, even with Singapore’s presence and involvement. To hedge 
Singapore’s strategic interests in India, Ascendas is reportedly collaborating with India’s largest engineering and 
construction conglomerate, Larsen and Toubro, to build Cyber Pearl in the third phase of Hyderabad’s Hitec City, 
while plans are in place to develop another IT park in Chennai. Negotiations to develop similar IT parks in other 
Indian states, on a turnkey basis, have already started. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The progress of Singapore’s overseas parks over a comparatively short period of time indicates the ability of the 
Singapore’s state enterprise network to mobilise economic and political resources to create economic space for the 
city-state. Through the flagship projects, Singapore has developed an area equivalent to 25 percent of the industrial 
land area managed by the state’s industrial land developer within the city-state.  Already attracted to the industrial 
townships are foreign investment commitments in excess of US$20 billion. The projects have obtained special 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
35 The Straits Times, December 1, 2003. 
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investment conditions within their overseas localities, and government endorsements which further underlines the 
significance of the projects. On the other hand, Singapore’s overseas parks exist as investment enclaves within a 
disjointed economic and policy environment. 
 
In Indonesia, BIP is now a well-established project, but it has not necessarily achieved all its development goals. It 
has been a springboard for Singapore-Indonesian co-operation in Riau, but it is not yet clear that Singapore has 
obtained the resource benefits looked for. BIP may be at risk from the breakdown of the township as a separate 
enclave, and the larger social tensions existing on Batam. The BIE project has been struggling to gain investment 
momentum, arising both from the increased competition for foreign investment and the restricted appeal of its 
operating conditions. Over the longer term, the political uncertainties and policy nuances that radiate from Jakarta 
are unlikely to add to investor confidence. 
 
In China, CS-SIP has attracted a high level of foreign investment, fulfilling the intended niche of accommodating 
high-value projects from investors that are most at risk from administrative uncertainties, and lending credence to 
Singapore’s positive reputation with the multinationals. The Park's problems stem from the lack of priority obtained 
from its local development partners, many of whom are involved in competing developments or are seeking to 
promote Suzhou as a whole, and not just CS-SIP. In retrospect, CS-SIP has experienced greater challenges as the 
`model’ was subjected to various, often incongruous, objectives thus setting the stage for conflicts of interest and 
discontentment. WSIP has been affected by legislative changes, reducing the viability of technology-intensive 
manufacturing for which the project is configured. All said, tangible and intangible benefits have to be 
acknowledged. The two flagship projects have paved the way for further collaborations in China, strengthening 
Singapore’s presence in the China market. Significantly, negotiations are at an advanced stage to develop Singapore-
styled industrial parks in Shanghai and Beijing. 
 
In Vietnam, Singapore’s investment in VSIP takes on an added dimension of rendering development assistance to an 
ASEAN partner, overtly to foster greater bilateral ties. It is apparent from the mix of ‘targeted’ industries, and the 
style of park management and operations, that the intention is for the local partners to have a stronger sense of 
`ownership’ of the project. The focus on specific industries that complement Singapore’s economic restructuring is 
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also absent, unlike in BIP or BIE.  All the same, underlying vested interests to secure the city-state’s economic 
interests can be associated with the act of camaraderie. Notwithstanding the explicit or implicit objectives, intense 
market competition, and the inherent problems of corruption work in tandem to test this strategic initiative.   
 
In India, ITPL can be perceived as a strategic thrust by the Singapore government to capitalize upon first mover 
advantages in a regional economy with immense market potential. As the first entrant to successfully develop and 
manage a state-of-the-art technology park, ITPL has arguably enhanced Singapore’s reputation for infrastructure 
efficiency and corrupt-free administration. More subtly, its apparent success has leveraged various Singapore 
companies’ foray into the Indian IT industry. The apparent success of ITPL should not be overestimated, as the 
Park’s infrastructure efficiency is constrained by the limited support from the local government. The project’s 
infrastructure efficiency is at risk from an environment of disparities in local-state support for competing 
developments. 
 
In summary, the Singapore government’s role in developing, managing and operating the overseas industrial parks 
has been crucial from the start. However, initial assumptions of the advantages engendered by the state enterprise 
networks, as successfully proven through its GLC network domestically, were overly optimistic. Differing agendas, 
sometimes within the same host government, intertwined with the cultural and political complexities of large 
economies, and the uncontrolled external environment, serve to diminish the efficiency and commercial viability of 
the Parks. On hindsight, the ambition and optimism of developing an ‘exportable version’ of GLC networks, and 
strategic alliances with regional governments, have been misplaced. The limits of state enterprise networks, beyond 
demarcated geographical boundaries, have been exposed in the R2000 projects. 
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Table 1: Operational Statistics of Singapore’s Industrial Parks 
 in Indonesia, China, Vietnam and India 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
 
China 
 
Vietnam 
 
India 
 
 
General Information 
 
 
 
BIP 
 
 
BIE 
 
CS-SIP 
 
WSIP 
 
VSIP 
 
ITPL 
 
Scale of Development (hectares) 
Investment by Developer 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up (hectares) 
Investment by Tenants  
Export Value (for 2002) 
No. of Employees 
 
 
500 
US$470m 
82 
320  
>US$1bn 
>US$2bn 
65,000 
500  
US$113m 
35 
110 
>US$100m 
>US$280m 
13,000 
 
7,000 
US$12.4bn 
395 
980  
>US$12bn 
n.a. 
44,000 
 
800 
US$258m 
75 
235 
>US$1bn 
>US$1bn 
15,000 
 
1,000  
US$600m 
124 
300 
> US$1bn 
>US$2bn 
24,000 
 
700  
US$200m 
100 
1.4 million ft2 
n.a. 
n.a. 
8,500 
 
n.a.: not available. 
 
Source: SembCorp Industries, China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park and Ascendas International. 
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